Kansas City Police Department

In 2008, Kansas City Police Department faced operational failures rooted in accountability issues, blame culture, and broken communication.

Internal Conflict and Broken Communication

The department's relationship with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) had collapsed. Both sides hired attorneys for what promised to be expensive, drawn-out collective bargaining. The atmosphere was "icy and hostile" officers who had once worked side-by-side as partners now refused to speak to each other. Chief James Corwin watched as blame replaced collaboration and legal battles replaced problem-solving.

Lack of Accountability Creating Financial Crisis

The elite 1910 SWAT Squad became the most complained-about unit in KCPD, averaging three complaints per month. "Most of the complaints we received for the 1910 squad were complaints regarding excessive force," explained Pearl Fain, lead attorney and director of the Kansas City Office of Community Complaints.

Each complaint costs between $70,000 and $100,000 to process, investigate, and file, regardless of whether it went to litigation. Yet many within the department dismissed community complaints as inevitable, refusing to take accountability for their impact.

As one SWAT team member admitted: "Everybody's problem was just a problem. It's not my problem. I don't really care. I'm getting paid to do what I do."

Blame Culture Destroying Performance

The firearms training program exemplified the blame problem. In 2007, 147 officers failed their first-time firearm qualification. Sixteen failed even after a second attempt.

Range instructors blamed the "problem shooters" for not showing up to optional Friday practice. They assigned struggling officers to the left side of the range, supervised by multiple instructors "to ensure they didn't do something stupid like shoot themselves in the foot." Some used high-pressure language to "challenge" shooters during practice.

The blame was always external: shooters didn't want to improve, community members were problems to manage, the union was the enemy. No one examined how their own approach might be creating the very problems they faced.

Chief Corwin recognized that traditional enforcement tactics—more rules, more pressure, more confrontation—weren't solving these accountability and communication issues. The department needed to address the root cause: how officers saw their role, their colleagues, and the people they served.

After reading "Leadership and Self-Deception" and attending an Arbinger workshop, Chief Corwin brought Arbinger to police headquarters to address the accountability crisis.

Breaking Down Blame Between Department and Union

Corwin arranged a workshop bringing together department heads, FOP members, and key leaders—deliberately seating them among each other rather than on opposite sides. "It wasn't long before we could see the walls beginning to break down and people starting to connect with the other people in the room," one participant recalled.

Near the end of the first session, Chief Corwin addressed his former partner, now an FOP member: "Whatever happened to Jim and Steve? Why does it have to be The Chief and Officer Miller?"

By the second day's end, both sides moved from blame to accountability. Chief Corwin announced the department would abandon collective bargaining for a "meet and confer"—a good-faith meeting to find solutions without wasted legal resources. Both sides committed to owning their part in the breakdown.

Building Accountability in the SWAT Squad

Arbinger facilitators invited Sergeant Chip Huth of the 1910 SWAT Squad to attend a workshop. Initially, Chip thought he'd discovered what was wrong with everyone else—the classic blame mindset.

But as he engaged with the material, his perspective shifted: "When I really began to understand Arbinger, it began dawning on me that I had been a problem in ways I hadn't been seeing."

Chip started holding himself accountable for his impact on both citizens and colleagues. He seriously considered the root cause of community complaints instead of dismissing them as inevitable.

As his team witnessed Chip's shift from blame to accountability, the entire 1910 squad followed. They realized how seeing others as objects invited resistance. They asked themselves: "How can I help things go right for these people and this community?" even during dangerous tactical interventions.

Eliminating Blame in Firearms Training

Sergeant Ward Smith, firearms training supervisor, investigated the 147 qualification failures differently. Instead of accepting instructors' blame of "problem shooters," he asked: "How are these shooters treated when they do show up?"

He discovered the blame culture in action: segregating struggling officers, supervising them to prevent "stupid" mistakes, using high-pressure tactics that destroyed confidence.

Smith reframed the question: "If I come to practice and continually find that I am put on the left side of the range, or berated by an instructor, don't I begin to think of myself as a poor shooter? What are we accomplishing by embarrassing them?"

Instead of blaming shooters, Smith took accountability for creating an environment where they could succeed. He met with struggling officers during lunch breaks, working with them individually. As other instructors stopped blaming and started helping, performance improved dramatically.

When KCPD addressed accountability and eliminated blame culture, operational performance transformed across the department.

The labor dispute that threatened costly litigation resolved through collaboration. Department members who hadn't attended the training were shocked to see FOP members congenially talking with department leaders—the "us vs. them" mentality had evaporated.

The 1910 SWAT Squad stopped blaming community members and started taking accountability for their impact. They went from three complaints per month to zero complaints related to search warrants for ten consecutive years. The millions saved in litigation costs alone justified the investment. For their exceptional results, the squad earned a special unit citation.

The firearms training program eliminated the blame mindset and saw dramatic improvement. Failure rates dropped from 147 in 2007 to just 20 in 2012—a reduction of 86%. Officers who once dreaded range time began enjoying it. Field safety improved significantly.

Community relationships improved as officers stopped seeing residents as problems to manage. As one officer reflected: "I felt like every situation and every issue was its own. Even though I might take an extra five or ten minutes with an individual more than I would have before, when I've left, I feel like I've truly helped somebody."

The shift from blame to accountability created a ripple effect: better morale, improved tactical acumen, increased motivation and productivity, and stronger relationships between officers and community members.

Kansas City Police Department proved that accountability issues, blame culture, and communication breakdowns can't be solved with more rules or enforcement. When KCPD shifted from asking "What's wrong with them?" to "How am I contributing to this problem?", they eliminated millions in litigation costs, improved operational effectiveness, and rebuilt trust internally and externally. Real accountability—taking responsibility for your impact on others—solved problems that traditional approaches couldn't touch.